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WSJ900813-0157
900813-0157.
Iraqi Chief Links
Kuwait Pullout
To Israeli Move
---
U.S. Rejects the Initiative,
Aimed at Rallying Arabs,
And Readies Blockade
----
By Gerald F. Seib and Walter S. Mossberg
Staff Reporters of The Wall Street Journal
08/13/90t397
WALL STREET JOURNAL (J), PAGE A3
MDEST FORGN
MONETARY NEWS, FOREIGN EXCHANGE, TRADE (MON)
PETROLEUM (PET)
FOOD PRODUCTS (FOD)
EXECUTIVE (EXE)
STATE DEPARTMENT (STD)
DEFENSE DEPARTMENT (DEF)
WASHINGTON -- Iraq's Saddam Hussein, his options for
endinge400
the Persian Gulf
crisise399
growing increasingly unpleasant,
assumede401
the
rolee462
of embattled Arab hero in
offeringe403
his first rough
proposale404
for a negotiated
ende405
to the
confrontatione406
.
The Iraqi leader, in an "
initiativee407
"
designede408
as much to
rallye411
Arab public
opinione412
as to
launche413
meaningful
negotiationse414
,
announcede415
yesterdayt416
that he will
withdrawe417
his troops from Kuwait only if Israel
withdrawse418
from the West Bank and Syria from Lebanon. He apparently
hopese419
to
luree421
supporte422
from Arabs who have
spurnede423
him so far by
suggestinge424
that Iraq will
usee425
its
occupatione426
of Kuwait as a lever to
solvee427
the Arab world's most frustrating
probleme428
, the 23-year Israeli
occupatione429
of land
claimede430
by Palestinians.
| 1 |
Even as
Saddam Hussein
was
searchinge2
for a
ploye3
to
easee5
his
isolatione6
, though, the international
pressuree431
against him
clickede7
up another notch.
| 2 |
The
White House
yesterdayt432
disclosede8
that
Kuwait
's ousted government has formally
askede9
the
U.S.
to
enforcee11
the total trade
embargoe433
the
United Nations
has
imposede12
on
Iraq
,
allowinge13
the
U.S.
and other nations to immediately
begine15
stoppinge16
ships
carryinge17
Iraqi goods.
| 3 |
Secretary of
State
James Baker
,
speakinge18
on
ABC News
' "This Week,"
saide19
the Kuwaiti
requeste20
givese21
the
U.S.
and other countries "a legal basis for
stoppinge22
the
exporte434
of oil and that sort of thing."
| 4 |
The
U.S.
maintainse24
that under the
U.N.
charter, the Kuwaiti
requeste25
triggerse26
steps for the collective
enforcemente27
of international
sanctionse28
.
| 5 |
Mr.
Baker
declinede29
to
usee31
the word
blockadee32
, but
saide33
that
"
interdictione34
" of Iraqi
shipmentse35
would
begine435
" almost instantly."
| 6 |
In a
statemente38
, the
White House
saide39
it would
doe40
"whatever is necessary" to
ensuree43
compliancee44
with the
sanctionse45
.
| 7 |
Other Bush
administration officials
saide46
that the international naval force in the area -- consisting of American, British, French, Canadian, Soviet, German and Australian ships -- may be
usede48
both to
stope51
oil
exportse436
from
leavinge53
Iraq
and
Kuwait
and to
stope55
shipmentse56
of food and
other goods from
goinge58
in.
| 8 |
President Bush
impliede59
as much
yesterdayt437
when reporters
askede61
whether the
interdictione62
would
applye63
to food.
| 9 |
The president
respondede65
, "Everything, everything."
| 10 |
While
shyinge67
away from actually
usinge69
the word "blockade,"
Mr. Bush
acknowledgede72
that the
U.S.
and others were
tryinge73
to
blocke75
shippinge76
to
Iraq
.
| 11 |
"No point getting into all these semantics," he
saide78
.
| 12 |
"The main thing is to
stope81
the oil from
cominge83
out of there."
| 13 |
The naval interdiction force is part of an overall American strategy that officials say is designed to leave the Iraqi leader with only the stark choice of backing out of
Kuwait
or launching new attacks to change his situation.
| 14 |
Though they insist they are n't trying to lure
Saddam Hussein
into an attack, officials hope that if he strikes again, the
U.S.
and its allies will have such an impressive force in place in
Saudi Arabia
that they will be able to crush him in
retaliation.
| 15 |
Iraq
's first option, of course, may be simply to sit tight and hope it can endure a trade embargo longer than the
West
can live without Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil.
| 16 |
Speakinge117
on the
ABC
program,
Abdul
Amir al-Anbari,
Iraq
's ambassador to the
U.N.
,
assertede118
that an
embargoe440
on
Iraq
could
plungee119
the
U.S.
into a "
depressione442
" and the rest of the world into an economic "
crisise121
."
| 17 |
Iraq clearly
is
tryinge122
to
wooe124
back more Arab
supporte125
in case the
conflicte128
dragse129
on,
hopinge130
that its neighbors eventually will
helpe131
it
survivee132
a prolonged
ware133
of economic attrition with the
West
.
| 18 |
So
Saddam Hussein
on
Fridayt443
triede134
to
scaree136
other Arab leaders into
supportinge138
him by
callinge139
on
Arabs to
risee141
up in a holy
ware142
against leaders who
invitede144
American and other Western soldiers into
Saudi Arabia
to
protecte146
the oil-rich kingdom.
| 19 |
Then
yesterdayt444
, he
triede147
to
enticee149
Arab leaders with his
proposale150
for a diplomatic
solutione151
linkinge152
his
occupatione153
of
Kuwait
with
Israel
's
occupatione154
of the
West Bank
.
| 20 |
The
proposale155
also
callede156
for
replacinge157
American and other Western troops in
Saudi Arabia
with Arab forces.
| 21 |
The
Bush
administration immediately
saide158
it "categorically "
rejectse159
the
proposalse160
.
| 22 |
And
President Bush
yesterdayt445
,
askede161
whether he was at least glad
Iraq
is
discussinge162
negotiationse163
,
repliede164
: "I do n't
seee165
anything to be
pleasinge168
in there at all."
| 23 |
American strategists are calculating , though, that the trade sanctions -- enforced by an effective though perhaps undeclared naval blockade -- will hold tightly enough to convince
Iraq
that it will lose in the long run by simply standing pat.
| 24 |
At that point, rather than
goe180
through the humiliation of
backinge182
out of
Kuwait
, the Iraqis might well
concludee183
that they
neede185
to
lashe187
out in some way to
shakee191
things up.
| 25 |
In that event,
Saddam Hussein
appearse192
to
havee196
three
choicese194
.
| 26 |
The first would be to
launche198
the much-feared direct
invasione200
of
Saudi Arabia
,
hopinge201
to
seizee203
some Saudi oil fields and
improvee204
his bargaining position.
| 27 |
But that
optione205
is
growinge206
less and less likely as thousands of American, British, Egyptian, Syrian and Moroccan forces
assemblee207
in and around
Saudi Arabia
to
protecte209
the kingdom.
| 28 |
The Saudis even have in their
possessione210
48
Kuwaiti jet fighters, virtually the entire Kuwaiti air force, which
managede212
to
escapee214
the Iraqi
invasione215
, Saudi officials
saide216
.
| 29 |
The Saudi "window of vulnerability . . . is
closinge446
very fast,"
Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the Saudi ambassador to
Washington
,
saide218
over
the weekendt447
.
| 30 |
The second
possibilitye448
would be to
starte220
a
fighte222
with
Israel
, in hopes that all Arabs would have to
movee227
behind
Iraq
in a
fighte228
against their common Israeli enemy.
| 31 |
In such an event,
Saddam Hussein also
might
calculatee230
, the Saudis would be under
pressuree468
to
kicke234
out
U.S.
troops because of
America
's close ties with
Israel
.
| 32 |
Iraq
could
starte235
hostilitiese699
with
Israel
either through a direct
attacke237
or by
attackinge239
Jordan
.
| 33 |
Israel
has publicly
declarede240
that it will
responde241
to an Iraqi
attacke242
on
Jordan
because it wo n't
allowe243
Iraq
's dangerous army to
takee703
control of
Jordan
's long border with
Israel
.
| 34 |
Iraq
's third attack
optione247
would be to
starte249
an undeclared
ware251
on the
U.S.
and other Western nations through
terrorisme252
.
| 35 |
Two
Middle East
terrorists with records of successful attacks against Western targets,
Abu Nidal
and
Abu Abbas
, have ties to
Baghdad
.
| 36 |
And even terrorist groups that opposed
Iraq
in its war with
Iran
show signs of swinging behind
Saddam Hussein
now that he is in a confrontation with the
U.S.
And
Iraq still
hase262
thousands of Americans and other Westerners under its control
in Iraq
and
Kuwait
.
| 37 |
They are n't being
allowede263
to
leavee266
and could
becomee267
hostages.
| 38 |
If
Iraq
chooses a simple war of nerves and economic attrition, the
Bush
administration knows a long stalemate could try the patience of the American public and the
West in
general, and could open the possibility that moderate Arabs -- even including
Saudi Arabia
-- might drop out of the effort
against Iraq
and accept some deal from
Saddam Hussein
.
| 39 |
But
U.S.
officials have
sizede281
up
Saddam Hussein
as a man who, despite some recklessness, will
backe282
down if he must.
| 40 |
"This is a guy who is impulsive, and therefore capable of big
miscalculationse284
,"
sayse285
one senior administration official
involvede286
in
managinge288
the
crisise289
.
| 41 |
The official
addse290
, though,
that "at the same time, we
thinke293
he is someone who is
capablee702
of rational
judgmentse295
when it comes to power.
| 42 |
And when he
findse299
something is unprofitable, then one can
seee300
certain
accommodationse302
."
| 43 |
Thus, administration aides will be
tryinge303
to
calculatee305
whether
Saddam Hussein
's
proposede454
diplomatic formula for
gettinge307
out of
Kuwait
representse308
the first
signe309
he is
searchinge310
for a
waye311
out or simply is a public relations
stunte313
.
| 44 |
There are disagreements among experts about how much pressure will be needed to make
Saddam Hussein
decide he's up against the wall and whether simple economic pressure will ever be enough.
| 45 |
The biggest worry is that if he decides he needs a way out of his predicament but does n't see a face-saving method, he could lash out in dangerous and unpredictable ways.
| 46 |
U.S.
officials
claime327
they already
seee328
signse329
Saddam Hussein
is getting nervous.
| 47 |
In the first days after
President Bush
announcede331
the
dispatchinge455
of
U.S.
troops, they note, the Iraqi leader
madee333
several nationwide
addressese334
indirectly -- having them
reade336
by a television announcer.
| 48 |
"That
showse337
he's nervous about
pinpointinge338
his location, either because he's afraid we'll
finde340
him, or that internal enemies will,"
sayse342
one
U.S.
official.
| 49 |
The unpredictability of
Iraq
's leader is a principal reason the
U.S.
is going to such great lengths to build a mammoth force in and around
Saudi Arabia
.
| 50 |
Pentagon
officials
saye349
the
goale350
is to
pute352
40,000
troops in the region by
the end of the montht456
.
| 51 |
But the administration is n't
puttinge354
any upper
limite700
on how high the force could
goe357
after that,
calculatinge359
that it would be a
mistakee361
to
underestimatee363
and an advantage to
keepe365
Saddam Hussein
guessinge366
.
| 52 |
U.S.
commanders in charge of
planninge367
for
Middle East
crisese457
have
indicatede368
in the past that they were
capablee369
of
deployinge370
as many as
300,000
troops.
| 53 |
And the
U.S.
is
takinge372
similar steps to
ensuree374
that its naval force is
adequatee701
to
carrye376
out a
blockadee377
of
Iraq
and
supporte378
a
ware379
if necessary.
| 54 |
Over the weekendt458
,
Pentagon
officials
confirmede381
reportse382
that a fourth
U.S.
aircraft carrier -- the
John F. Kennedy
-- and its powerful group of support ships could
heade461
for the
Middle East
within a few days.
| 55 |
Three
other carriers and their escort vessels already are
stationede383
within striking distance of
Iraq
or are
steaminge384
toward the area.
| 56 |
But unless the military situation
changese385
drastically, military officials
saye386
, the most likely plan will be for the
Kennedy
to eventually
replacee388
the
carrier Dwight D. Eisenhower
, which has been on
patrole389
since
Marcht702
and was
schedulede391
to
returne393
to port before hostilities
eruptede394
in
Kuwait
.
| 57 |
---
Andy Pasztor
contributed to this article.
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